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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RCTH YV. SHUPE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
dba )IEXLOYE
COXSTRGCTIO:N CO)IP ANY,

ROY A.

~IENLO\'E,

Case No.
10405

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
In plaintiff-respondent's action for a declaratory
judgment construing a written cost-plus-percentage
contract for the construction of a home and to enjoin
lien foreclosure pending determination of the case,
defendant-appellant counterclaimed under the contract
and for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The controversy oyer amounts owed to appellant
1

was submitted to a jury on :l special verdict containing
three interrogatories (R. 133). The jury determined
that appellant ha<l substantially performed, that his costs
including profit and overhead, totaled $43,000.00, and
that respondent was entitled to a $1,230.00 offset for
defective construction and delay. From the $43,000.00
figure the COJ.Irt deducted the off set and the sum of
$18,551.00, agreed to have been paid to appellant previously, and entered judgment for $23,219.00 plus
$2,136.14 interest, or a total of $25,355.14, each party to
bear his own costs and attorney's fee (R. 137-139).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent has not appealed, believing that the
judgment of the trial court is supported by the record.
The appellant contends that the jury was obligated to
award him all costs of construction as shown by his own
books and records, and that he was entitled to costs and
attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is devoted primarily
to evidence 1 he believes supports his contention that the
jury was required to award him approximately
$50,000.00 for partial completion of a $35,000.00 house.
Most of the testimony and evidence supporting the ver·
i Some reliance is placed on "evidence" not offered at the trial.
For example, at page 8 of his brief appellant quotes fromd ~;:
Shupe's deposition, and at page 10 from one of respon en s
answers to interrogatories. Neither of these excerpts was pre·
sented to the jury.
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did and judgment is omitted, glossed-over, or passed-off
as being material to some other issue. Accordingly, it is
difficult for respondent to meet her obligation under
Rule 75 ( p), U tab Rules of Civil Procedure, to express
specific disagreement with inaccurate statements of fact.
There is no dispute that under date of November 2,
HHi2, respondent and appellant entered into a contract
(Exhibit P-1) under which appellant was to construct
a residence on respondent's lot at 1203 Yale Avenue.
Respondent's husband, Clarence G. Shupe, had had
plans prepared by an architect and the Shupes met with
appellant to discuss them ( R. 162). Mrs. Shupe testified
that at the meeting appellant said the building would
rn5t no more than $35,200.00, the price being based upon
an estimate of $12.00 per square foot for the main floor,
$6.00 per square foot for a basement apartment,
$1,000.00 for a carport, $300.00 for the garage, $1,500.00
for extra concrete, $1,500.00 for a patio, $800.00 for a
redwood fence, $1,300.00 for contingencies, and
$3,200.00 for owrhead and profit (Exhibit P-2). Appellant promised completion promptly- not more than
four months ( R. 208).
Appellant submitted statements to the Shupes and
for a time the statements were paid in due course, but
when l\Iarch, April and May bills totaling over $19,000.00 were all presented at once, costs had risen to about
$38,000.00 with $12,000.00 worth of work remaining to
make th~ house habitable, and appellant was told to
moye off the job (R. 186). Thereafter, work was done
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to put the house in such condition that it could be occupied by the Shupes (R. 206).
The amount awarded by the jury as costs of construction was almost $8,000.00 more than appellant had
said the house would cost.
Trial of the cause began on March 2, 1965, and
ended at about 10:30 o'cloc,k p.m. on March 10, 1965.
During the seven trial days respondent called seven
witnesses and appellant twenty-six. The transcript of
testimony contains 758 pages. Sixty-nine exhibits, con·
taining numerous documents were offered in evidence,
and sixty-eight were admitted.

It is not practical to set forth all testimony or
exhibits tending to support the verdict. But the facts
set out below certainly justify a jury finding that ap·
pellant's costs were substantially less than claimed:
Prior to execution of the cost-plus-percentage con·
tract dated November 2, 1962, the appellant made a
detailed analysis of specifications on an FHA form
(Exhibit P-14; R. 211-212, 244-245). He calculated
a price of $12.00 a square foot for a main floor of
1,800 square feet and added various extra costs, telling
the Shupes that the amount computed by him repre·
sented the "outside costs" of construction ( R. 164) ·
The contract was drawn by appellant himself (R.
235). It provided that Menlove C!mstruction Company
would maintain liability insurance and all insurance
"necessary with labor as to compensations for any type
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of insurance necessary under the laws of the State of
Utah" (Exhibit P-1). There had been no discussion
with .Mr. or Mrs. Shupe about charging separately for
the part of overhead reflected by Social Security taxes,
payroll taxes, unemployment compensation and the like,
but in charging his costs, it was appellant's practice to
add to payroll costs ten per cent for Social Security,
payroll taxes, and unemployment taxes, prior to the
addition of another ten percent for overhead and profit
(R. 239-241).

During the construction of the house great quantities of materials, including lumber, paint, hardware,
and other supplies, were purchased from Apex Lumber
Company. The painter, who had submitted a bid including labor and paint, was told to obtain his paint
through Apex (R. 696). Appellant was a substantial
owner of Apex Lumber Company (R. 245). It was the
practice of Apex to charge "wholesale price" plus ten
percent on supplies and materials purchased by the four
o\\·ners of the company. Of this ten percent, five percent
was for overhead and five percent was added to the
"capital investment" of the owner-purchaser ( R. 7 46),
increasing his equity in the business ( R. 7 42). During
the time that materials were being purchased from
Apex Lumber Company for the Shupe residence, the
manager of the company (R. 253), and the painter
(R. 259) both knew that the material was being purchased for use on a cost-plus contract (R. 253). During
construction Mr. Menlove had mentioned to Mr. Shupe
that he had an interest in Apex and could get materials
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and save money through that company, but he did not
disclose that he stood to make an additional profit because
of purchases from Apex Lumber Company (R. 253).
An independent builder, Carl R. Ohran, who had no
captive lumber company could buy lumber at prices at
about the same level as those shown to have been charged
by Apex (R. 361).
Max .Menlove, appellant's son, was to be the supervisor of construction, but during the period he was also
supervising construction of the World Motor Hotel
addition. He was making periodic checks at the Shupe
residence. The men employed by Menlove "knew what
they were doing" so it appeared unnecessary to him to
have anyone else supervise them (R. 263-264).
Appellant's record-keeping indicates he was not
too concerned with skyrocketing costs on the Shupe
home. Each of his men kept a time card which was turned
in every two weeks. The cards reflected that a man was
on the job, but not what he was doing (R. 264). Max
.Menlove admitted it was the practice of appellant, on
cost-plus contracts, to keep track of the hours worked
by the men but only to keep track of them as a cost,
how the costs are running being "entirely up to the
owner, what he expects and does" (R. 267). But in
keeping track of time spent on his own fixed price contracts, it was customary for the appellant to maintain
records of how the men were spending their time, so
that a judgment could be formed as to whether the job
is being operated efficiently ( R. 266-267, 308).
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In proceeding with the Shupe contract, sometimes
competitive prices were obtained and sometimes they
weren't ( R. 270). No record was kept of the bid received
on lumber purchased from Apex Lumber Company
(R. 274). Some of the prices for concrete on the job

included overtime charges, which resulted in the failure
to unload a truck within the time allotted by a concrete
vendor ( R. 27 4). Men from the Shupe job were sometimes moved down to the World Motor Hotel job. At
the World Motor Hotel job (also cost-plus) a "fairly
good record" was kept as to where the time and materials
were spent ( R. 277). No cost breakdown was made with
respect to the Shupe residence until it was needed for
the lawsuit ( R. 309).
Appellant had his painter obtain paint from different wholesalers and then run the purchase through Apex
Lumber. Max Menlove did not attempt to control the
amount of paint purchased. The amount charged respondent for the paint was based entirely upon how
much the painter ordered ( R. 278) . Max Menlove, the
supenisor, never did make an inspection of the area
or determine whether the paint subcontractor was ordering more paint than he needed (R. 279). Although
appellant obtained a bid under which the painter was
to furnish the paint and labor for $1,680.00 (R. 669),
the painter and his two employees were placed on the
Menlove payroll, with the paint being obtained from
Apex Lumber Company (R. 280). The Shupes were
charged $1,695.00 for painters' labor, of which about
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$1,400.00 was paid to the painters (Exhibit IO, p. I:
R. 692).

Dissatisfaction with construction of the house led
.Mr. Shupe to complain to the Utah State Department
of Contractors ( R. 321). .Mr. E. A. Hendrickson of
that department made an inspection and found numer·
ous instances of substandard, faulty or unfinished con·
struction, for example: the paint was peeling because
sheet metal fills were not soldered at the joints and per·
mitted water to get underneath them ( R. 323) ; the hose
bib on the south side of the house protruded from the
wall some two inches ( R. 323) ; planter boxes needed
to be waterproofed and the strike on the front door was
poorly installed ( R. 323) ; sidelights on the front door,
both inside and out, were below standard; the concrete
front door sill had not been tiled or stoned and water
was thus permitted to go through the sill into the base·
ment ( R. 323) ; the sill on the tool closet was very rough
and indications were that no effort had been made to
finish it; the soil under the front walk, and that at the
south side of the house to the east had all settled, and
there was an opening under it for an area of some eight
feet; the risers and treads of the outside stairway to
the basement were not of equal size, not according to
code, and dangerous; the window well in the basement
apartment had not been plastered and there was no
caulking around any of the openings (R. 324) ; the concrete sill upon which the sliding door rests was poured so
high on the outside that a screen could not be installed
d yerv
on the sliding door; concrete was honeycom bed an
·
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rough, not having been properly tamped; the bridging
awl the herringbone structures between the floor joists
was I x 2, while the building code calls for I x 3 (R.
325) ; one of the water heaters was turned in such a
manner that it was impossible to obtain access to the
controls or to put a hose on the bottom of the tank to
drain it; the basement apartment door to the guest
closet was badly warped; on the west balcony a beam
had been slivered in several places, and the decorations had been put over the slivered part; the sliding
door on the east of the livingroom could not be opened
with anything except quite a great effort because it
was under a great presure from the top (R. 326) ; the
tile in the master bedroom was very poor; wardrobe
doors in the northwest bedroom were not plumb; the
main entrance door to the northwest bedroom door
was "hinge bound and warped" (R. 327). In the opinion of Mr. Hendricksen, a great many of the items to
which he referred were "caused or the result of lack
of supervision" ( R. 329) .
Carl R. Ohran, an experienced homebuilder, made
an inspection of the Shupe home for the purpose of
estimating the cost of completion, examining the defects,
and arriving at a conclusion as of the cost of construction (R. 3-t.6-347). In making his examination Mr.
Ohran examined the home itself, plans and drawings,
and statements and invoices submitted by appellant
(R. 349).

The rafter beams in the house had failed, and his
opinion was that they woud not have if gussets had been
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glued and nailed in accordance with good building
practices ( R. 349), in which case the bond would hare
been stronger than the beams. Mr. Ohran noted that
the paint had been poorly applied, surfaces having been
improperly prepared by sanding and spackling, that
the water heater had been installed backwards and that
part of the plumbing was not complete ( R. 350). The
steps leading out of the basement required correction.
the front entrance platform was so placed that it
drained into the front door, indicating improper grading
or sinking, probably a result of carelessness in grading
the concrete when it was installed. Two or three doors
had warped and needed replacement, and joints on the
balcony and the balcony railing had been damaged by
water and warping ( R. 352). Dirt had settled out
from under the raised walk along the carport ( R. 352).
Mr. Ohran's opinion was that the reasonable costs
of construction of that house on that lot, from the
ground up and including the ten per cent for over·
head and profit, would come to about $35,000.00 some $7,000.00 under the figure the jury ultimately
found the construction did cost-and this cost would
include all on site construction with the exception of
retaining walls that were put in to retain the upper
banks ( R. 356-357) . Of this cost, about $4,000.00
would be for labor ( R. 358 )-a figure some $8,000.00
less than the cost of labor testified to by Max Menlove
(R. 313). Painting labor costs would be about $600.00
or $700.00, instead of $1,695.00 (R. 361).
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Prices charged for lumber by Apex Lumber Company were about the same as those at which Mr. Ohran
could purchase similar lumber at retail ( R. 361) . The
quality of the items used in the Shupe home were about
average quality ( R. 397).
That the construction was so shoddy that it was
unlikely appellant could have spent the amount claimed
1ras also evidenced by photographs of various parts
of the building and areas of construction, admitted in
e\'idence as Exhibits P-16 through P-45 (R. 422-438).
Improper preparation of the subsoil led to subsidence of the patio concrete, evidenced by the accumulation of water during wet weather (R. 471).
Testimony of applicant's subcontractors varied to
a considerable degree as to what was done and what
the participation of the Shupes was. Some testified
that they believed that their recovery from Mr. Menlove
depended upon the outcome of his claim against the
Shupes ( R. 650, 707 -708) .
The plumbing and heating contractor had difficulty in his installation because of the fact that the
appellant had dumped "two big loads of gravel" in
the house, rendering more difficult the work of the subcontractor ( R. 507) .

In excavating for the building appellant's men
used a truck with sides only 12 or 18 inches high, and
no record was kept of the number of loads hauled (R.
608). The supervision exercised by Max Menlove con11

sisted of his coming on the job, telling the men what
should be done, staying there if he was able to, or
leaving if he had something else to do ( R. 609) . It
was sometimes the practice of the men to work on both
the Shupe residence and the Motor Hotel on the same
day (R. 609).
Paul Menlove, one of the appellant's sons, was
employed in the organization at a monthly gross salary
of $510.00 (R. 752, 777) for 50 or 60 hours per week.
The amount he received from appellant was $2.00 to
$2.50 per hour, but the Shupes were charged the stand·
ard carpenter rate of $3.25 per hour plus 10 per cent
for Social Security, unemployment compensation, and
other payroll taxes ( R. 778).
Appellant testified that he talked with .Mr. Shupe
in June and that Mr. Shupe then thought that the
house was costing too much money; but he had con·
sistently refused to discuss any decrease in price and
had insisted upon receiving the full $30,910.00, the
amount of his claim as shown by his books (R. 798).
The cost of all material and subcontractors on the
job, exclusive of the overhead and profit for Menlove
Construction Company and its own labor costs would
have been about $33,700.00 (R. 870).
Max Menlove, another of appellant's sons, worked
in the business with the expectation of receiving the
benefits of the business, that is, running the business
and working into it someday. For his services he was
paid a salary of approximately $700.00 per month, but
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in computing the amounts charged to the respondents
for services of Max Menlove, no attempt was made to
determine how much those services actually cost appellant (R. 877).

There was some evidence introduced at the trial
with respect to a great number of the matters alluded
to in appellant's brief, and a jury might have accepted
appellant's argument that the claimed costs were actually incurred. Appellant made a forceful argument
to the jury, and same jury argument has been made to
this court in the appellant's brief. As is frequently the
case in jury arguments, the appellant's brief overstates
the facts and arrives at invalid conclusions. For example, from testimony that expensive door locks were
used in the house, appellant says the Shupes made no
effort to reduce costs; on the basis of testimony that the
Shupes approved a number of subcontract bids appellant concludes that they approved all of them, as well
as the labor charges for appellant's sons and employees.
The record is not "clear that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe
apprm·ed each subcontract for each phase of construction and actually selected all of the items of any consequence that went in the house," as stated on page 6
of appellant's brief. Mr. Shupe testified that he was
aware of many of the prices, but that the bid prices of
all the subcontracts were very vague and usually were
adjusted from one figure to another, and that he never
did receive a formal subcontract which he could approve
or disapprove (R. 196).
The appellant states in his brief that "the record
13

is undisputed that the men employed by Menlove Construction Company who worked upon the premises kept
records with respect to their time and were compensated
on the same basis as they were compensated in all other
construction by the company," but as pointed out abore,
there was evidence that the record keeping in connec·
tion with fixed-price contracts and some other cost-plm
contracts of the appellant were more detailed to reflect
the amount of time spent on particular work, rather
than just the amount of time that could be charged
against the owner.
In short, from three volumes of testimony the
appellant has selected bits and pieces from which a
jury might have found in his favor, and has relied upon
them as constituting a basis upon which this court should
hold as a matter of law that he is entitled to the relief
he asks.

ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED AP·
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOT,VITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND
PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT ~
THE SPECIAL VERDICT.
In challenging the verdict of the jury, appellant
appears to have lost sight of the fact that the burden
was upon him to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the moneys he claims to have expended
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were reasonably paid for materials and work on the
job.
Appellant also appears to have lost sight of the
fact that evidence of the reasonable cost of construction
of the house, appellant's early estimates or promise,
and substandard workmanship and materials, are probatiw not only upon such questions as "substantial
performance" and "quantum meruit", but also upon
whether claimed costs were actually and reasonably
incurred by appellant in construction of the Shupe
residence.
The statement in appellant's brief (page 24) that
the parties proceded on the assumption that appellant's
damages were liquidated if he substantially performed,
simply is not true. If it had been true, there would have
been little purpose in appellant's calling a coterie of
subcontractors in an attempt to prove his costs.
Throughout the presentation of the plaintiff's case,
eridence with respect to reasonable values, defects, and
promises, and improper charges, were offered and adnlitted without objection and without any request on
the part of the appellant for a limiting instruction.
From a plethora of testimony and documents relating to the use of labor, the purchase and stockpiling
of materials and the extent to which the contractor
may have paid subcontractors amounts to which they
were not legally entitled, the jury arrived at a total
cost figure. The jurors were not auditors and were not
obligated to proceed after the manner of auditors. But
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they were able to and did come to a definite conclusion
as to the accuracy of the total claim of appellant.
There was evidence from which the jury could find.
for example, that the claimed costs were completely
out of line with what the house should have cost and
that it was unreasonable, therefore, to believe that all
of the claimed amounts were in fact expended toward
construction of the house; that although in his contract
appellant had undertaken to pay all insurance and
taxes relating to employees, he nevertheless added ten
per cent to his payrolls for Social Security, workmen's
compensation, insurance, payroll taxes, and the like;
that he charged as a "cost" an amount credited to his
capital account in Apex Lumber Company; that his
workmen were permitted to keep incomplete and inaccurate records relating to the job; that there was
not enough supervision to make certain that charges
for labor were accurate; that respondent was charged
more than appellant's costs for services performed b)·
appellant's sons; that although appellant could have
had all of the painting done for $1,680.00, he charged
the Shupes $1,695.00 for labor alone, instructed the
painter to purchase paint from Apex and charged the
respondents for the paint and his capital credit; and
that the workmanship in the house was so poor that
it was unlikely that the quantites of labor and materials
charged by appellant were actually used on the job.
Appellant had no cause to complain that the jury
did not audit his accounts. The jury was not asked
16

to find with respect to individual adjustments, and the
court is deemed to have made necessary findings on any
:ssues not submitted. Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Appellant insists that the jury, in refusing to do
what a ppelant wanted it to do, stubbornly ignored and
refused to be guided by "competent, credible and uncontradicted evidence" with respect to the appellant's
costs. \Ve submit, however, that the case is not substantially different from Arnold "Wlachinery Company
v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 357 P.2d
~96, which appellant cited and attempted to distinguish.
In this case, as in Arnold Machinery, the record keeping
and the means of knowing the extent of and necessity
for expenditures were primarily within the control of
the appellants; there were numerous and substantial
improper charges; and evidence was presented through
5elf-serYing records and through interested witnesses,
induding subcontractors interested in a recovery by
appellant. As the court said in that case, 357 P.2d 496,
498:

"One of the favorable aspects of trial by jury
is that it provides a safeguard * * * by bringing
together people of varied experience and different points of view, and permitting them to apply
their practical judgments in the settlement of
disputes. '¥hen one party makes what they deem
to be harsh, excessive or unreasonable demands,
it is their privilege to modify or ameliorate them
to comport with their own sense of fairness and
justice. To accomplish that objective it is neces-
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sary Jhat the jury be allowed considerable latitude of judgment; and their determination
should not be disturbed so long as it appears to
be within the limits of reason."
The court pointed out in that case that if a witness
can be disbelieved entirely, he can be disbelieved in
part, or his testimony discounted to any reasonable
extent.
If there are circumstances which reasonably pro·
vide a basis for a jury to refuse to find in accordance
with testimony, or where prejudice, bias, or self-interest
is shown, or where there is anything incredible about
the evidence, the jury need not accept it. Aagard v.
Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company et al.,
12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522; Page v. Federal Securit.IJ
Insurance Company, 8 Utah 2d 226, 332 P.2d 666.
Such circumstances, bias, and incredibility exist in this
case.

Moreover, the question presented to the jury was
not simply one of the amount spent by appellant. The
court's instruction No. 12 (R. 105) set out the law
with respect to the right to recover on a cost-plus-per·
centage contract as follows:
"In a cost-plus-percentage contract with a
licensed builder, an owner has the right to expect
the same skill and ability to be applied to the
work as would have been applied if the contractor
had undertaken the work for a fixed price.
"The burden is upon the defendant to establish
that he proceeded honestly and skillf~llf and
with due regard to the right of the plamtiff. In
18

this connection, you are instructed that a contractor does not have the right to expend any
amount of money he sees fit upon such a contract, regardless of the propriety, the necessity,
or honesty q,f the expenditure, but must show
that the money he claims to have expended were
reasonably paid for materials and work on the
job."
The appellant took no exception to the instruction
as required by Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and while respondent recognizes the continuing power
of the court to review the giving of the instruction, the
court has held that it will not ordinarily do so unless
some persuasive reason exists for failure to except, and
that the burden of showing special circumstances rests
upon the party seeking to avoid the effect of a rule.
McCall v. McKendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962.
Kot only did appellant fail to except to the instruction,
he appears to have accepted it as the law of the case,
not having referred to it in his statement of points.
In any event, the instruction was substantially
correct. Cases relating to recovery under cost-pluspercentage contracts would have justified an instruction
limiting appellant's recovery to his "reasonable costs."
A good statement is found in Shaw v. Bula Cannon
Shops, Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So.2d 916:
"The rules of law controlling 'cost-plus' contracts are well established. Upon reason and
authority, where a person agrees to do work for
another upon a cost-plus basis, it is his duty
to keep accurate and correct accounts of all material used and labor performed, with the names
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of the materialmen and laborers, so that the
owner may check up the same. He must use
the same skill and ability as is used in contract
work for a gross sum. If the aggregate cost upon
the face of the account is so excessive and un·
reasonable as to suggest gross negligence and
fraud, the law would impose upon the contractor
the duty of establishing the bona fides of his
performance of the work. The contractor does
not have the right to expend any amount of
money he may see fit upon the work, regardless
of the propriety, necessity, or honesty of the
expenditure, then compel repayment by the other
party, who has confided in his integrity, ability
and industry. [citing cases]. In an action upon
his contract for payment, the contractor must
show that the moneys which he claims to hare
expended were necessarily paid for materials
and work upon the .job and if the contractor fails
to do thiY he should only be allowed a reasonable
cost and his percentage." (Emphasis added).

1

1
1

1

1

The case was cited with approval in Walsh Sert ices
v. Feek, 45 Wash. 2d 289, 274 P.2d 117, a case in which
a remodeling project estimated by a contractor to cost
$4,592.98 ended up costing $9,172.02. The Washington
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judgment that
the contractor recover only for $4,982.54, noting that
the trial judge had before him the original estimate,
the invoice, the recap sheet and the job sheet, that he
took notes, that he was thoroughly familiar with all ,
phases of the work done and that he saw and heard the
witnesses.
1

1

1

Other cases bearing upon the obligations of cost·
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plus contractor are Wendell v. Maybury, 75 So.2d 379
(La. App. 1954); Lagasse v. Allen, 54 So.2d 6 (La.
1951) ; Lee v. National Cylinder Company, 58 So.2d
568 (La. App. 1952); Jensen v. Manthe, 95 N.W.
2d 699 (Neb. 1959) ; 1'itle Guarantee & Trust Company v. Pam, 155 N.Y.S. 333, aff'd 192 App. Div.
268, 182 N.Y. Sup. 824, 232 N.Y. 441, 134 N.E. 525;

Pathe' Laboratories v. DuPont Film Mfg. Corp., 3

F.R.D. 11 (U.S.D.C., So. D. N.Y. 1943}.
Appellant's position is not helped by the fact that
respondent was the one who introduced appellant's
invoices in evidence or otherwise offered testimony relating to appellant's billings. The evidence was offered
to prove what appellant attempted to charge, not what
costs were properly incurred. Besides, even if a party
is "bound by his own evidence," he is not precluded
from presenting contrary or conflicting evidence, and
obtaining its benefits. The citation from Corpus Juris
Secundum, at least in the present edition, does not support th~ statement in appellant's brief. See 32A C.J.S.,
Evidence §1040 ( 1), p. 762:

" * * * Since a party cannot question the
credibility of the evidence. which he presents,
where he introduces evidence adverse to his contontions, and fails to contradict such evidence,
he is precluded thereby.
"It is only in this limited sense and as another
formulation of the rule against impeachment of
one's own witnesses iu certain ways that the
frequent statement that one is bound by the
evidence that he produces has any validity. A
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party's claim or defense need not be rejected by
the court merely because he produces any evidence which negates this contention. Adverse
testimony on a material issue by a party's witness
will not def eat his claim if his case is established
by other competent evidence. The fact that the
evidence presented by a party is contradictory
and conflicting and that some of his evidence is
adverse to his contentions does not defeat his
right to prevail; he is not bound by the more
adverse evidence, but may ask the court to
accept the testimony in the light most favorable
to him. Similarly a party may ask that the court
accept part and reject part of the testimony of
a witness he has produced."
The effect of a party being "bound" by his own
evidence was considered by this court in Schlatter l'.
McCarthy, 196 P.2d 968, 113 Utah 543, wherein the
court said:

" * * * but a party is not bound by every
statement that his witness makes, and he may,
by testimony of other witnesses and in argument
to the jury, show that the facts are different
from those testified to by the witness. This Is
permitted, not for the purpose of impeaching
the witness (although it may have that incidental
effect), but for establishing the true facts. It
would be a monstrous rule that would bind a
party to every statement of every witness pro·
duced by him. * * * The party who calls se~eral
eyewitnesses is entitled to argue before the JUfY
that it should believe the facts as testified to be
the witness most favorable to him."
See also McCormick on Evidence, page 70, in
support of the view that the rule against impeaching
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one's own witness does not forbid a party from producing other evidence to dispute the facts testified to by
his witness.
The jury had before it competent and credible
evidence from which it could conclude that the costs
claimed by appellant for construction of the house
either were not incurred as claimed or were incurred
unreasonably and in disregard of the rights of respondent.

II
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 3 AND 4 DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE THE LAW, AND THE
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
THEM.
Appellant cites as error the trial court's refusal
to give two requested instructions. Requested Instruction No. 3 would have advised the jury that the parties
had entered into a written contract (for the construction of the house) and that it was in the nature of a
cost-plus contract. There was no dispute as to these
matters, and they were fairly covered in other instructions.

It is not error for a trial court to refuse an instruction when its subject matter is adequately covered in
other instructions given. Wilson v. Gardner, IO Utah
2d 89, 348 P.2d 931; Duncan v. Western Refrigeration
Co., 11 Utah 2d 19, 354 P.2d 572; and Rivas v. Pacific
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Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 185, 397 P.2d 990.

The remainder of the requested instruction was not
only misleading and an incorrect statement of the law,
but was in conflict with other instructions given by the
court and expressly acquiesced in by appellant. The
requested instruction would have told the jury that ,
their "sole duty and prerogative" was to determine ·
the total costs of construction, add ten percent and !
bring in a verdict for appellant in that amount. As
indicated under Point I of this brief, this is not the
law. The contractor under a cost-plus contract is not
ipso facto entitled to his costs, plus the agreed percentage, but only to those costs reasonably, necessarily and
in good faith incurred in connection with the contract.
This was set out in Instruction No. 12 and is supported
by the cases.
In addition, the requested instruction is completely
inconsistent with other instructions such as those relating to offsets. Appellant not only failed to take exception to such instructions but explicitly informed the
court that the issue of offsets was properly in the case.
In excepting to Instruction No. 22, counsel for appellant said it was "the position of the defendant that the
only issue properly submitted to the jury in this connection is with respect to any offsets which the jury
might find, if any" (R. 908). It is difficult to understand how appellant can now take exception to the
refusal of a proposed instruction which would hare
eliminated that issue.
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It is also well established that the trial court is
not required to re-rrite a requested instruction or to
O'ive one which is erroneous in any respect. Earle v.
1'
Salt Lake and Utah R. Corp., 109 Utah lll, 165 P.2d
877; Bloomquist v. Buffelen Mfg. Co., 47 \Vash. 2d,
828, 289 P.2d 1041. As stated by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Schultz v. Shirley, 189 Ore. 363, 220 P.2d 86,
88:

"The trial court is not required to segregate
the wheat from the chaff and give the portion
of the instruction that is proper."

In his argument concerning the court's refusal to

gire the above instruction, appellant states that "the
jury should have been instructed in substance and effect
that they should not be permitted to speculate as to
what the cost might have been by some other person
in building the house." That, however, is not the instruction requested.
Appellant also complains of the trial court's failure
to give his requested Instruction No. 4. Generally,
what respondent has said about Instruction No. 3
applies as well to the latter instruction. Moreover, that
requested instruction was in effect, an instruction for
a directed verdict in appellant's favor-unwarranted
by the evidence.
Appellant's suggestion in his brief that "respond:nt will not even argue upon appeal that the contractor
18 not entitled to recover costs plus 10% in the instant
litigation" exemplifies an attitude evidenced throughout
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his brief, that appellant had no responsibility to justify
his claimed costs. It is now obvious that appellant's
suggestion is erroneous.
It is contended by appellant that he was entitled
to a cautionary instruction that there is nothing illegal
or improper about a cost-plus contract. Respondent
submits that such an instruction was unnecessary. There
was not even an intimation throughout the trial that
such contracts were in any way improper. Other in·
structions clearly imply that such were accepted types ,
of contracts, e.g., Instruction 12, 20, and 23. Appel·
lant's assertion that there has been popular discredit
in this area of cost-plus contract, is completely without
foundation.

In any event, as stated in 88 C.J .S., Trial, §320:
"The giving or refusal of cautionary instructions rests largely in the discretion of the trial
court, therefore the ref using of them is not error,
especially where there is nothing in the evidence
to indicate that they are needed, or where the
jury are fairly instructed on the law of the
case. . . . "
See also 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §610.
The verdict returned by the jury shows that the
jurors were not under any misapprehension that the
contract in the present case was illegal.
III
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN RE·
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FUSING TO RECEIVE DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 67; IN ANY EVENT, REFUSAL TO
.ADMIT THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Appellant complains that the trial court erred in
refusing to admit a summary prepared by appella11t
purportedly showing costs incurred on the job. Error
is predicated primarily upon Section 78-25-15 ( 5) Utah
Code Annotated [cited by appellant as 78-2.5-12(5)).
That section provides that:
"There can be no evidence of the contents of
a writing, other than the writing itself except

***

" ( 5) 'Vhen the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time, and
the evidence sought from them is only the general
result of the whole."

For several reasons this exception to the best
eridence rule is not applicable to this case. First, appellant's accounts were not so numerous that they
could not be examined without a great loss of time.
They constituted only a few thin manila folders, which
were admitted in evidence.
Second, and more important, the evidence from
them was not merely the general result of the whole.
Appellant, who prepared and identified the exhibits,
testified as follows in response to a question as to what
information he utilized in preparing the exhibit: (R.
866):
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"I utilized the invoices and the information
on this invoice relative to materials and whe 11
they were delivered and the labor as it's shown
there, and by my own information or knowledq 1
what I could remember from the job. Also wiial
type of work individuals were doing for us 011
the job." [Emphasis added.}
From the above testimony it appears quite clearly
that no sufficient foundation was established. The ex·
hibit included items gained from the witness' own
knowledge and what he could remember from the job.
Nor does it come under the analagous rule expressed
by this court in Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co.,
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 and Nalder v. Kelloq1;
Sales Company, 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350. As stated
in the latter case, the exhibit was not "based on records
or other data available for examination."
Pertinent to this case is language contained m
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68,
193 P.2d 656, where the Kansas court held that it was
error for the trial court to have admitted an alleged
summary of books examined by the witness because he
"assumed matters not shown by the records he ex·
amined.''
In offering the exhibit, counsel for appellant di<l
not even contend that the exhibit purported to be sup·
ported by his books already in evidence, or that it was
offered to prevent examination of a large number of
books and records. The offer was made as follows (R.
867):
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''We offer Exhibit 67 as an aid to supplement
the witnesses' testimony with respect to these
matters. \Ve would stipulate that if there are
any items which are contained in this exhibit,
which are not reflected in the evidence, they may
be disregarded, but this offer is made for the purpose of illustrating and making more understandable the witnesses' proposed testimony
* * * " [Emphasis added.]
As pointed out in respondent's objection to the
admission of the evidence, this would have had the effect
of giving undue emphasis to the testimony of a particular witness. After having retired to the jury room,
the jurors, while having to recall testimony of respondent's witnesses, would have been able to peruse at will
the contentions made by appellant, as his own principal
Titness.
In any event, the exclusion of the exhibit did not
prejudice appellant. His counsel was permitted to and
did use the exhibits to argue to the jury. He pinned
the exhibit to the bulletin board and argued extensively
from it, going down the same item by item. The jury
had the "benefit" of the exhibit, and the only consequence of its not being admitted was that they did
not take it to the jury room. If there was error in
refusing to admit the exhibit, it was harmless and nonprejudicia,l to appellants. Under Rule 61, Utah Rules
of CiYil Procedure, it would not be grounds for disturbing the judgment.

Further, respondent points out that the accuracy
of the exhibit on its face is questionable. Items appear
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to have been duplicated (such as A-3 - C-12, and A-J.'
I
B-4 - C-15) or repeated for no explainable reason. It I
is submitted that appellant's accounts, admitted in eri· ;'
dence, are more understandable than the exhibit.

IV

i

i

THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO I
AWARD COSTS, INCLUDING A REASON- i
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE TO THE APPEL·
LANT.
I

Before any action was brought there had been a
serious dispute between the parties as to the amount
due. The appellant himself testified that in a comer·
sation about the charges Mr. Shupe had said that if
appellant would take $23,000 for his claim, .Mr. Shupe
would pay it, but the offer was rejected by appellant
as "ridiculous" (R. 796). The appellant adamantly
refused to take anything less than the total $30,910.00
he claimed ( R. 798) .
The respondent was thus faced with the prospect
of either paying to appellant the total amount of his
claim, even though the Shupes considered it much too
high, or seeking a court determination of the amount.
She elected to bring an action.
On December 19, 1963, when the appellant had a
period of approximately nine months remaining within
which a lien foreclosure action could be brought (see
lien claim, Exhibit D-62), the respondent filed a decla·
ratory judgment action to determine the amount due.
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1

1

fo paragraph 2 of her prayer, respondent asked the
court to order that the time within which appellant
might foreclose the lien be tolled pendente lite.
The award of attorney's fees in lien foreclosure
actions is governed by two sections of Title 38, Utah
Code Annotated 1953:
"38-1-17-As between the owner and the contractor the court shall apportion the costs accordiny to the right of the case, but in all cases each
subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall haYe his
costs awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien
and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be
incurred in preparing and recording said notice
of claim of lien.
"38-1-18-In any action brought to enforce
any lien under this chapter the successfu,l party
shall be entitled to recoYer a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in this action." (Emphasis added.)
Inasmuch as attorney's fees are referred to as being
part of the "costs" of the action, and in owner-contractor actions the court has the right to apportion
costs "according to the right of the case," it is reasonable to construe the sections as providing that in ownercontractor actions the court may apportion attorney's
fees according to the right of the case. It would be
unreasonable for the legislature to permit the court
to make an equitable adjustment in a few dollars of
court costs, but require it to award the much larger
attorney's fees to one party or the other without regard
to the right of the case.
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Moreover, under the facts and circumstances 01
this case, the appellant was not the "successful party,
the judgment awarded is in substantially the amount
that Mr. Shupe had offered to pay appellant months
before. Paragraph 7 of the respondent's complaint
( R. 2) read as follows :

"Plaintiff is ready and able to pay the amount
lawfully due but believes and alleges that the
amount claimed by defendant exceeds the amount
actually due pursuant to the agreement of the
parties; plaintiff further believes and alleges
that if defendant incurred expenses in !ht
amount claimed that he did so unnecessarilv be·
cause of his negligence and inefficiency a~d or
his lack of skill and ability as a builder and con·
tractor.'' (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff obtained the relief she was seeking. There
was no dispute as to whether some amount was due
and owing. The purpose of the action was to establish
the amount which was done. The amount awarded to
the appellant was enough less than the amount of his
claim that he should not be regarded as the successful
party. The term is not defined in the code.
This court apparently has not considered this exact
question but a similar one was before the court in
Millard v. Parry, 2 Utah 2d 217, 271 P.2d 8.52. There
the contractor had sought to recover on a cost-plus con·
tract but the court found that no cost-plus contract
had been entered into. A judgment was ultimately
entered providing that the homeowners would be obli·
gated to pay subcontractors in the amount of $4,338.47,
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which was $435.30 more than owed to the contractor
by the homeowners. The contractor contended that
attorney's fees and costs should not have been awarded
to the homeowners because the court had found that
at the commencement of trial a balance of $3,803.17
was due from the homeowner to the contractor under
the construction contract, notwithstanding the court
thereafter permitted payment to be made directly to
subcontractors. This court upheld the award of attorney's fees to the homeowner.

Hooper v. Fletcher, an early case decided by the
Supreme Court of California, 145 Cal. 375, 79 Pac.
418, was also an action for foreclosure of a mechanic's
lien. The trial court, having originally granted attorney's fees to subcontractors, ordered a new trial unless
they agreed to elimination of the fee. The subcontractors
, were seeking the full amount of their liens but were
entitled only to a portion if the homeowner was correct
in his contention, raised in the answer, that a contract
between him and the original contractor had been re' eorded and was valid. He admitted that he had $1,025.00
in his hands and averred his readiness to apply it to
the payment of the lien. The court found that the
contract was valid, but held in Finding No. 12 that
the homeowners "participated in the trial herein, and
entered into the contest in favor of certain defendants
* * * and generally contested as to the disposition of
said funds so deposited, and delayed and harassed
plaintiffs and defendants, who were lien claimants, m
the collection of their claims out of said funds."
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On appeal the Supreme Court held that the e11 .
dence did not support the Finding and that a new tria 1
was proper, saymg:
"As to the only question which the respondent
Simas [the homeowner J raised by his answer ht
was the prevailing party, and there was 110
ground for imposing a lien on his land for these
onerous attorney's fees, in addition to the bal·
ance due on the contract, unless the facts found
in Finding 12 were true."
In the present case, because of the refusal of the
appellant to consider a compromise of his claim, it was
necessary for the respondent to seek court aid. She
could not tender the amount due, since a determination
of that amount required a proceeding in which the bona
fides of appellant's expenditures could be ruled upon
If lien claimants are entitled to recover an attorney's fee in every case in which they establish a ralili
lien (though for substantially less than the cla1111:,
unconscionable results are foreseeable. The threat nf
onerous attorney's fees could be used against home·
owners for the purpose of coercing them into paying
inflated lien claims despite a genuine dispute as to the
amount due. By permitting the trial court to apportion
the costs, including the attorney's fee, "according to
the right of the case," the opportunity for extortion
by either party can be eliminated.
In any event, most of appellant's trial efforts were
directed at proving a larger claim than he had coming.
so that the trial court in determining a "reasonable fee''
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nught have made it zero. Appellant did not refer to
any pages of the record supporting his claim for attorneys fees, and respondent has been unable to find any.

v
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
THE APPELLANT'S .MOTION FOR NE\V
TRIAL.
Following entry of the judgment in the case the
appellant moved for a new trial. The motion (R. 140)
assigned each of the grounds specified in Rule 59, Utab
Rules of Civil Procedure, except "accident or surprise"
but was not accompanied by affidavits as required by
Rule 59 \ c), and therefore lacks factual support with
respect to irregularity in the proceedings, misconduct
of the jury, and newly-discovered evidence.
The other three grounds were substantially the
same as have been urged by the appellant in connection
with this appeal, i.e., that the evidence was insufficient
to jusify the verdict, that he did not receive adequate
damages, and that the court committed error in law.
No new issue is presented by failure of the court
to grant a new trial and there would appear to be no
purpose in arguing this point at length. The respondent
will content herself with pointing out that there is no
basis for an assumption that the jury in this overlylong, sometimes dull building contract case was influenced by passion or prejudice; that motions for new
trials are addressed to the discretion of the trial court;
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and that its discretion will not be disturbed absent
clear abuse. Burlock v. Shupe, 5 Utah 428, 17 Pac. rn
Tousey v. Etzel, 9 Utah 329, 34 Pac. 291; and Cret/1
v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264.

CONCLUSION

In this brief the respondent has cited to the cow:
pages of testimony and exhibits justifying the jury,
verdict and gainsaying appellant's lament that his co1:
evidence was so "competent, credible and uncontra·
dieted" that a jury had no choice but to beliew him
all the way.

The construction was shoddy, careless, and poorh
supervised; the appellant made improper charge,
against the job; and the total costs claimed were u1
reasonable enough to raise questions as to his gou1 1
faith, skill, and care, in looking out after the Shupt:
interests, particularly in light of the cost-plus-percen'
age formula that "higher costs equal higher profits.·
1

The appellant's complaints about the refusal I
give instructions and admit an exhibit in evidence ~r
not well taken, and in any event do not represent anr
error which can be shown to have been prejudicial
Inasmuch as the respondent was the successfa
party with respect to obtaining a determination of Iii
amount claimed by appellant, and in good faith l1:1i
offered to extend the time within which an action n1ig~
be brought to foreclose the lien of the appellant. an
11
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since the amount recovered by the appellant was substantially what had been offered by the respondent's
husband some months before, the court was justified
in refusing to award costs (includ,ing a reasonable attorney's fee), to the appellant.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
Ralph L. Jerman
411 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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